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Patents play an increasingly important role in innovation and economic performance. Between 
1992 and 2002, the number of patent applications filed in Europe, Japan and the United States 
increased by more than 40%. The increasing use of patents to protect inventions by businesses and 
public research organisations is closely connected to recent evolutions in innovation processes, the 
economy and patent regimes. Scientific and technological advances have created new waves of 
innovation, notably in information and communications technology (ICT) and biotechnology, and 
innovation processes themselves have become centred less on individual firms and more dependent on 
interactions among global networks of actors in the public and private sectors. Shifts in the legal and 
regulatory framework of patent regimes have resulted in more expansive domains of patentable subject 
matter (patent regimes in many countries now include biotechnology and software), and more robust 
and more valuable patents. 
Changes in patent policy in OECD countries over the past two decades have fostered the use and 
enforcement of patents with the aim of encouraging investments in innovation and enhancing the 
dissemination of knowledge. Despite these reforms, few systematic economic evaluations have been 
carried out to better inform policy choices. To what extent have changes in patent policies over the 
past two decades been beneficial to innovation and technology diffusion? What particular aspects of 
patent policy in OECD countries can be seen as successful, or have failures occurred? These questions 
are central to this report, which covers a range of areas, and highlights some unresolved issues that 
policy makers should address in the near future: 
Markets for technology are increasingly important for the circulation of knowledge. Patents 
play a pivotal role in the development of technology transactions. Governments need to 
improve their knowledge of the functioning of markets for technology and the effect of such 





Encouraging patenting by public research organisations (PROs) has led to increased com-
mercialisation of inventions derived from publicly funded research - hence generating greater 
benefits to society - but may have made it more difficult for researchers to access certain types 
of basic science. Governments should ensure access to basic inventions, for instance by 
monitoring patenting and licensing practices at PROs, and by reinstating and clarifying the 
exemption for research use, which is now being restricted. 
In biotechnology, the surge in innovation, notably by start-ups, benefited greatly from the 
possibility of obtaining patent protection, which attracted the capital needed in this area. In 
certain upstream fields, such as genetic material or genetic testing, there are cases where 
patents might still impede access to technology. The quality (novelty) and breadth of patents in 
these areas need to be reviewed. Governments should explore ways to encourage alternative 
means of disseminating knowledge, such as the public domain, and to improve the diffusion of 
patented inventions, e.g. through the promotion of patent pools and the publication of licensing 
guidelines. 
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Software and services are new subject matter for patents, although to a different extent across 
countries. The impact of patents on innovation and diffusion in this area has yet to be sys-
tematically evaluated, and such evaluation is sorely needed. The quality and breadth of 
software patents also need to be monitored, and patent offices should keep up their efforts to 
systematise their experience and knowledge base. The role of patents in the expanding world 
of open source software also needs to be evaluated.   
• 
Economic evaluation suggests that there are further possible directions of change for patent 
regimes that are worth exploring. Possible avenues for economic-based reforms of patent regimes 
include introducing a more differentiated approach to patent protection that depends on specific 
characteristics of the inventions, such as their life cycle or their value (as opposed to the current 
uniform system); making patent fees commensurate to the degree of protection provided; and 
developing alternatives to patenting, such as the public domain. In the near future, the patent system 
will be facing even greater challenges than those it has confronted in the past two decades, including 
increased globalisation, the overwhelming use of Internet as a vehicle of diffusion, and expanded 
innovation in services. Well-informed and more global policies will be needed to prepare the patent 
system to meet these new challenges, so that it can continue to fulfil its role of encouraging innovation 
and technology diffusion. 
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1. Introduction 
Patenting experienced a sizeable boom in the last decade. More than 850 000 patent applications 
were filed in Europe, Japan and the United States in 2002, against about 600 000 in 1992. These 
figures reflect the growing importance of patents in the economy. Business and public research 
increasingly use patents to protect their inventions, and fostering this trend has been the objective of 
patent policy in OECD countries over the past two decades, with a view to encouraging investments in 
innovation and fostering the dissemination of knowledge. To what extent has this been the case? What 
particular aspects of patent policy in OECD countries can be seen as successful in this regard, or have 
there been mainly failures? These questions are central to this report. 
Figure 1. Patent filings at EPO, USPTO and JPO
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EPO and USPTO filings: Total number of applications JPO filings: Total number of claims
 
1. EPO and USPTO filings correspond to total number of applications. JPO filings correspond to total number of claims (number 
of claims per application multiplied by total number of applications) to account for the effect of the 1988 law reform allowing 
more than one claim per patent application at JPO. 
Source: OECD Patent Database and USPTO, EPO and JPO Annual reports. JPO figures for 2001 and 2002 are OECD 
estimates. 
Growth in patenting corresponds to a new organisation of research that is less centred on the 
individual firm and more based on knowledge networks and markets: innovation processes throughout 
the OECD area have become increasingly competitive, co-operative, globalised, and more reliant on 
new entrants and technology-based firms. Market mechanisms play a more central role in technology 
diffusion. Businesses have been demanding more and more patents to accommodate these new 
conditions.  
At the same time, patent regimes themselves have experienced major changes that have 
encouraged an increase in patenting. Not only have new types of inventions – software, genetic, and 
business methods – been deemed patentable by some patent offices, but the ability of patent holders to 
protect and enforce their rights has also increased, leading many to call the past two decades a pro-
patent policy era. There is little doubt that many of these policy changes have helped the patent system 
to cope with changes in innovation systems by attracting more private-sector funding for R&D and 
supporting the development of markets for technology to help diffuse patented knowledge. In that 
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sense, the patent system has been instrumental in the recent waves of innovation which have occurred 
in the fields of biotechnology and ICT. 
This strengthening of patent systems in the European Union, Japan and the United States has, 
however, raised new concerns and exacerbated old ones. There have been numerous claims that 
patents of little novelty or excessive breadth have been granted, allowing their holders to extract undue 
rents from other inventors and from customers. This has been of particular concern in software, 
biotechnology and business methods, where patent offices and courts have had most difficulties in 
responding to rapid change, building up institutional expertise, evaluating prior art and determining 
correct standards for the breadth of granted patents. More basically, it has also been asked whether 
patentability might hamper the diffusion of knowledge, and therefore innovation, notably in these new 
areas. Other concerns have been raised about access to basic technologies, and research tools, which 
seems to have been hindered sometimes by patent holders exercising their right to exclude. As 
universities are becoming more likely to patent and commercialise their own inventions, exemptions 
for research use of existing inventions are under threat, with the danger of public research being faced 
with rising costs and difficulties of access.  
Addressing these concerns and ensuring that patent systems continue to fulfil their mission of 
both stimulating invention and promoting diffusion of knowledge requires careful examination of 
broader issues. This report summarises OECD work to date on the relationships between patents, 
innovation and economic performance. It aims to place major changes in patenting patterns and patent 
regimes in the economic context, and to review the evidence regarding the links between patenting, 
innovation and diffusion in areas of particular interest (PROs, biotechnology, software and services). It 
provides policy-relevant conclusions based on existing analysis, and identifies policy issues and 
options for further consideration.  
Box 1. Patents and the patent system 
A patent is an exclusive right to exploit (make, use, sell, or import) an invention over a limited period of time 
(20 years from filing) within the country where the application is made. Patents are granted for inventions which 
are novel, inventive (non-obvious) and have an industrial application (useful). There are other types of exclusive 
rights over intangible assets, notably copyright, design protection and trademarks, but patents provide a broader 
protection that extends beyond the specific expression of an invention to the invention itself. Due to this control 
over the technology, the patent holder is in a position to set a higher-than-competitive price for the corresponding 
good or service, which allows recovery of innovation costs. In return, the applicant must disclose the invention in 
the text of the application, which is published 18 months after application. 
As a patent is valid only within the country in which it is granted, it is subject to national laws and litigation 
settled in national courts. The forthcoming community patent in Europe will be an exception, as it will provide 
protection in all EU member countries, and litigation will be centralised in a specialised court. International 
agreements such as the agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), signed in 
1994 and overseen by the World Trade Organisation (WTO), tend to place restrictions on what national laws and 
policies can do. TRIPS introduced intellectual property rules into the multilateral trading system for the first time, 
in an attempt to guarantee the same minimum standards of protection across countries. 
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2.  Economic issues raised by patents 
Viewed from the angle of innovation policy, patents aim to foster innovation in the private sector 
by allowing inventors to profit from their inventions. The positive effect of patents on innovation as 
incentive mechanisms has been traditionally contrasted with their negative effect on competition and 
technology diffusion. Patents have long been considered to represent a trade-off between incentives to 
innovate on one hand, and competition in the market and diffusion of technology on the other. 
However, recent evolutions in science and technology and patent policy and progress in the economic 
analysis of patents have nuanced this view: patents can hamper innovation under certain conditions 
and encourage diffusion under others. The impact of patents on innovation and economic performance 
is complex, and fine tuning of patent design is crucial if they are to become an effective policy 
instrument. 
Empirical evidence tends to support the effectiveness of patents in encouraging innovation, 
subject to some cross-industry variation. In a series of surveys conducted in the United States, Europe 
and Japan in the mid-1980s and 1990s, respondent companies reported patents as being extremely 
important in protecting their competitive advantage in a few industries, notably biotechnology, drugs, 
chemicals and, to a certain extent, machinery and computers. Companies in other industries reported 
that patents play a secondary, if not negligible, role as a means of protection for their inventions, as 
they tend to rely more on alternative means such as secrecy, market lead, advance on the learning 
curve, technological complexity and control of complementary assets (Levin, Klevorick, Nelson and 
Winter, 1987; Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 2000). 
However, patent protection may also hamper further innovation, especially when it limits access 
to essential knowledge, as may be the case in emerging technological areas when innovation has a 
marked cumulative character and patents protect foundational inventions. In this context, too broad a 
protection on basic inventions can discourage follow-on inventors if the holder of a patent for an 
essential technology refuses access to others under reasonable conditions. This concern has often been 
raised for new technologies, most recently for genetic inventions (Bar-Shalom and Cook-Deegan, 
2002; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2002; OECD, 2003a) and software (Bessen and Maskin, 2000; 
Bessen and Hunt, 2003).  
In addition, as has long been recognised, the main drawback of patents is their negative effect on 
diffusion and competition. As patents are an exclusive right that creates a temporary monopoly, the 
patent holder can set a market price higher than the competitive price and limit the total volume of 
sales. This negative impact on competition could be magnified as patent holders try to strengthen their 
position in negotiations with other firms, in an attempt to block access by competitors to a key 
technology, or inversely, to avoid being blocked by them (Shapiro, 2002). Such strategic patenting 
seems to have developed over the past 15 years, notably in the electronics industry (Hall and Ziedonis, 
2001).  
Nevertheless, patents can also have a positive impact on competition when they enhance market 
entry and firm creation. Not only is there evidence of small companies being able to assert their right 
in front of larger ones thanks to their patent portfolio, but patents may also be a decisive condition for 
entrepreneurs to obtain funds from venture capitalists (Gans, Hsu and Stern, 2002). Moreover, patents 
may enhance technology diffusion. Patenting means disclosing inventions which might otherwise be 
kept secret. Industrial surveys show that the reluctance of firms to patent their inventions is primarily 
due to the fear of providing information to competitors. This has been confirmed in the OECD/BIAC 
survey  on the use and perception of patents in the business community,  sent to firms in OECD 
countries in 2003 and in which respondents indicated their intensive use of patents as a source of 
information (Box 2; Sheehan, Guellec and Martinez, 2003). Patents also facilitate transactions in 
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markets for technology: they can be bought and sold as property titles or, more frequently, be subject 
to licensing agreements which allow the licensee to use the patented invention in return for payment of 
a fee or royalty (Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella, 2001; Vonortas, 2003). Finally, enhancing 
technology diffusion has been the goal put forward by governments to encourage universities to patent 
their inventions, with the objective of licensing them to businesses that will further develop and 
commercialise them (OECD, 2003b).  
In summary, the traditional view of patents as a compromise between incentives to innovate and 
barriers to technology diffusion, if not incorrect, presents a rather partial picture, as patents can either 
encourage or deter innovation and diffusion, depending on certain conditions. In fact, the effect of 
patents on innovation and diffusion depends on particular features of the patent regime. Patent subject 
matter, patenting requirements and patent breadth are three basic tools for policy makers involved in 
the design of patent regimes that could be used to enhance both innovation and diffusion (Encaoua, 
Guellec and Martinez, 2003): 
Patent subject matter is the domain of knowledge that can be patented, if the patenting criteria 
of novelty, non-obviousness and usefulness are also met. For instance, scientific discoveries 
and abstract ideas are generally excluded. Its definition must be based on a careful 
examination of when it is efficient for society to offer patent protection in addition to other 




Patenting requirement is the height of the inventive step required for a patent application to be 
granted. It is understood as the extent of the contribution made by an invention to the state of 
the art in a particular technology field. The higher that contribution, the more selective the 
process, thus the lower the number of patents granted. The lower it is, the larger the likelihood 
of finding many inventions with no significant social value. Conversely, too high a require-
ment would discourage innovations which, while not being radical, are still necessary for 
technological breakthrough to translate into actual products and processes. 
The breadth of a patent is the extent of protection granted to patent holders against imitators 
and follow-on inventors. Not only do patentees obtain exclusive rights on their own invention 
but also on other inventions which are deemed “functionally equivalent”, and to a certain 
extent on improvements of their inventions. Patents that are too broad allow their holders to 
“pre-empt the future”, while patents that are too narrow discourage research that feeds into 
follow-on inventions. 
Other policy or legal aspects have an impact on the patent system, including the amount of 
damages attributed by courts in case of infringement, the conditions for exemptions for research use, 
etc. Taken together, these aspects determine the strength of patents. Overall, excessively weak and 
narrow patents might deter business investment in R&D, as it becomes too easy for an imitator to 
undercut the inventor’s market price. Weak and narrow patents may also encourage secrecy at the 
expense of publicity, and harm markets for technology, hence hindering diffusion of technology. 
Conversely, excessively strong and broad patents may open the door to undesired strategic behaviour 
by patent holders, who may use their titles to appropriate revenue from existing inventions marketed 
by other companies. For instance, a broad patent on a basic invention with no substitutes may be 
equivalent to having an exclusive right of exploitation over an essential facility, allowing its holder to 
bar follow-on inventors who would be willing to invest in R&D to create socially useful applications. 
By carefully balancing these multiple instruments, policy makers can design patent regimes that are 
favourable to both innovation and diffusion. 
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Box 2. OECD/BIAC Survey 
The OECD and the Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD (BIAC) collaborated in 2003 on 
the development and implementation of a questionnaire on the use and perception of patents in the business 
community. The purpose of the questionnaire was to gather qualitative information about business patent and 
licensing practices and provide insight into evolving business strategies for managing intellectual property.  
An electronic questionnaire was developed and tested on a sample of BIAC member companies and a 
revised version was made available to firms through BIAC and its affiliated industry associations across OECD 
countries, and several OECD country delegations. Responses were sent directly to BIAC so that identifying 
information could be removed before the results were forwarded to the OECD for analysis.  
A total of 107 responses were received, predominantly from large firms (only 20% had fewer than 
1 000 employees or less than USD 10 million in annual R&D spending) and firms based in Europe. More than half 
of the respondents were in the chemical and pharmaceutical sectors, with the rest coming mostly from the ICT 
and machinery sectors. Figures presented in this report are raw results from the survey (no grossing up was 
performed on the data). 
Source: Sheehan, Guellec and Martinez (2003). 
3.  Recent trends in patenting in OECD countries 
Most patent offices have experienced a surge in patent applications in the past two decades, with 
the largest contribution to growth being made by new technologies (ICT, biotechnology) and to some 
extent originating in economies which have recently gained a significant position in the international 
technological landscape, such as Korea and Chinese Taipei (OECDc, 2003). 
The number of applications in the three major patent offices increased by 40% between 1992 and 
2002, which corresponds to a doubling of the number of applications at EPO and USPTO, and to a 
15% increase at the JPO (when adjusted for the increase in the number of claims allowed by law in 
1988). The growth rate of applications at the USPTO, which was as high as 9% per year at the end of 
the 1980s, slowed at the beginning of the 1990s and again reached a 10% annual growth rate at the end 
of the 1990s
1. The EPO has also experienced high growth since it received its first application in 1978. 
Growth rates at EPO were relatively high throughout the 1980s, mainly due to its progressive 
installation as a central patent office in Europe, stagnated in the first half of the 1990s, and resumed 
growth in 1995-2001, averaging almost 10% a year.  
                                                      
1.  The spectacular drop of USPTO filings in 1996 corresponds to the change in patent term from 17 years from 
grant to 20 years from application due to the implementation of the TRIPS agreement in the United States in 
1996, as many companies preferred to apply before the change (hence the higher growth in 1995). 
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Figure 2. Annual growth rates of filings at USPTO, EPO and JPO
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1. EPO and USPTO filings correspond to the total number of applications. JPO filings correspond to the total number of claims 
(number of claims per application multiplied by total number of applications) to account for the effect of the 1988 law reform 
allowing more than one claim per patent application at JPO. 
Source: OECD, Patent Database, September 2003, and USPTO, EPO and JPO Annual reports. 2001 and 2002 Japanese 
figures are OECD estimates. 
Even though the growth rate of patent applications at JPO was not as high as at EPO or USPTO 
in those years, JPO appears to have experienced similarly high growth rates in patent protection when 
filings are adjusted by the growth in the number of claims
2. The total number of claims in applications 
filed at JPO more than doubled over the period 1995-2001. Nevertheless, as the economic situation 
has deteriorated in OECD countries since the beginning of the 21
st century, patent numbers have fallen 
at the EPO and JPO in 2002 while they were sharply slowing down at the USPTO.  
As regards the origin of inventions, US inventors largely contributed to the first surge in patents, 
in the late 1980s, when their share of USPTO grants to OECD countries jumped from 50% to 55-57% 
and from 27% to 30-31% of EPO filings, levels that have stabilised since. Nevertheless, a significant 
share of the surge in patenting over the second half of the 1990s can be attributed to new arrivals on 
the world technology stage, notably Korea and Chinese Taipei, and, to a lesser extent, China, India 
and Israel. Among European countries, the number of patents filed by inventors from Germany, 
Finland and Sweden contributed significantly to the rise in EPO filings after 1995. 
                                                      
2.  Following a change in law in 1988, JPO has accepted patents including several claims. The number of 
claims per patent has continued to rise since this change, reflecting the increased breadth of any single patent 
in Japan. Hence, in order to fully capture the broadening scope of patent protection in the Japanese economy, 
patent numbers need to be corrected for this factor. 
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Figure 3. Average annual growth rates of USPTO grants and EPO applications 
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1. Based on the residence of the inventors and priority date. Selected countries are among the top 15 countries in both USPTO 
grants and EPO applications. Priority year corresponds to the initial date of filing of a patent application worldwide, regardless of 
subsequent filings in other countries; it normally corresponds to the date of filing in the applicant’s domestic patent office. 
Source: OECD, Patent Database, November 2003. 
Although nearly all technology fields experienced growth in patenting over the 1990s, two 
contributed disproportionately to the overall surge in patenting: biotechnology and ICT. The share of 
biotechnology in EPO filings climbed from 4.3% in 1994 to 5.5% in 2001 (filing years). During the 
same period, the share of ICT climbed from 28% to 35%. Nearly half of the growth of patenting in the 
EPO over this period is due to these two technology areas, even though initially they accounted for 
only one-third of patents. Patterns in the USPTO are similar. USPTO data from previous years show 
that the share of ICT increased slowly but consistently throughout the 1980s, started accelerating in 
1989 and grew at an even faster pace after 1995. The increase in the EPO share of certain countries 
such as Finland and Sweden can be traced essentially to ICT. To some extent, this is also the case for 
Germany, which had a 16.9% growth per year in ICT patents in 1995-2001 (compared to 11.9% for all 
OECD countries) compared with 7.5% for other technology areas (6.7% in OECD). 
Figure 4. Average annual growth rates of EPO applications 





















Source: OECD, Patent Database, November 2003. 
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The fact that the surge in patenting occurred mainly in new technology areas, where inventions 
have been more vivid over the past decade, suggests that patent numbers reflect trends in invention. 
This is supported by responses to the 2003 OECD/BIAC survey, in response to which firms assigned 
part of their increased patenting to growing numbers of inventions (Sheehan, Guellec and Martinez, 
2003). The picture is somewhat blurred when one looks at the ratio of patents to business-funded R&D 
(patents per dollar of R&D). This ratio, for US patentees at USPTO, increased firstly after 1986, and 
again after 1993, interrupting a very long-term declining trend prior to the 1980s. The most 
spectacular evolution is the 50% increase in this ratio for European patentees at the EPO between 1994 
and 2000, which was notably driven by Germany as country of inventor, and by ICT as an industry.  
Figure 5. Ratio of USPTO grants to industry-financed R&D
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1. R&D is measured as gross domestic expenditure on research and development (GERD), expressed in millions of 1995 USD 
using purchasing power parities and lagged one year. Priority year corresponds to the initial date of filing of a patent application 
worldwide, regardless of subsequent filings in other countries; it normally corresponds to the date of filing in the applicant’s 
domestic patent office. 
Source: OECD, Patent Database, November 2003. 
Figure 6. Ratio of EPO grants to industry-financed R&D
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1. R&D is measured as gross domestic expenditure on research and development (GERD), expressed in millions of 1995 USD 
using purchasing power parities and lagged one year. Priority year corresponds to the initial date of filing of a patent application 
worldwide, regardless of subsequent filings in other countries; it normally corresponds to the date of filing in the applicant’s 
domestic patent office. 
Source: OECD, Patent Database, November 2003. 
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The increase in R&D expenditures has contributed to the surge in patent applications, but cannot 
fully explain it. Changes in competition seem to have played a key role in growing patenting trends in 
ICT industries. Some studies have reported the relevance of building patent portfolios and strategic 
patenting behaviour for firms in the US semi-conductor industry and the European mobile phone 
industry. Changes in patent regimes might have also contributed to the increase by making patents 
more valuable and easier or less costly to obtain. The surge in patenting in the United States, notably 
in ICT, started after important court decisions increased damage awards to plaintiffs in infringement 
litigation, hence increasing the value of patents (e.g. the Kodak-Polaroid case in 1986). The extension 
of the subject matter, notably in the United States, resulted in a greater number of patents for software 
and genetic inventions. In addition, high grant rates in the United States may have attracted more 
applications which in turn have generated more grants, and part of the surge in EPO might have come 
from a sharp reduction in patent fees (effective in July 1997). Overall, a mixed picture emerges, with 
part of the surge in patenting being explained by growth in inventions, notably in new areas, part being 
contingent upon changes in the economic environment and in patent regimes (Kortum and Lerner, 
1999; Kortum, Eaton and Lerner, 2003). 
4.  The changing context: evolving innovation processes and markets for technology 
Changes in patenting and licensing behaviour occur against a backdrop of changes in industrial 
innovation processes. Over the last decade, the importance of innovation as a driver of competitive 
advantage in OECD economies has grown. Innovation has also become more globalised, with small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) playing an increasingly important role. These changes have 
contributed to more collaborative innovation processes that involve a larger number of more diverse 
actors and inter-linkages among them. Growing levels of business patenting have helped inventors 
appropriate the returns from their investments and facilitated co-operation via market-based 
transactions of knowledge.  
Innovation is central to business strategy. Firms in a wide range of industry sectors see 
innovation and R&D as means of improving their competitive advantage. Between 1990 and 
2001 industry-financed R&D in the OECD region rose 51% in real terms from 
USD 244 billion to USD 368 billion, or from 1.31% to 1.48% of GDP. Much of this growth 
was driven by high-technology manufacturing and knowledge-intensive service sectors, in 
particular ICT and pharmaceuticals – the same sectors that have seen the most rapid increases 




Globalisation of innovation processes. Foreign affiliates of multinational enterprises 
accounted for between 15% and 17% of total business manufacturing R&D in the 
United States, France and Germany in 1998, more than 30% in the United Kingdom, and more 
than 65% in Ireland and Hungary. These investments increased by more than 50% in the 
OECD area between 1991 and 1998 as firms located R&D closer to foreign markets (in order 
to adapt products to local needs) and, increasingly, closer to sources of scientific and 
technological excellence. The globalisation of R&D contributes to international patenting. 
The expansion of ICT and the Internet has accelerated the availability of information on new 
technologies, making secrecy a less viable strategy. Such codified information can be more 
easily accessed by competitors who can imitate in a shorter period of time, thus reducing the 
efficiency of market-based strategies of appropriation. As the number and variety of potential 
competitors has increased notably due to globalisation, innovative companies have been 
demanding enhanced legal protection, including patents. 
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New technology-based firms play an important role. In the United States, R&D in SMEs grew 
at almost twice the rate of R&D in large firms during the 1990s, with the smallest firms 
increasing the most rapidly. This trend was supported in part by increased venture capital 
funding to the advantage of the activities for new technology-based firms. Patents are 
especially important to new technology-based firms because such firms often have few assets 
other than their intellectual property, and need patent protection to attract venture capital. The 
ability to license intellectual property further enables their participation in the innovation 
networks of other firms. 
• 
•  Greater collaboration. The growing technological complexity of products and processes, 
increased technological opportunities created by recent scientific advances (e.g. life sciences, 
ICT, nanotechnology), rapid technological change, more competition and higher costs and 
risks of innovation are forcing firms to work in greater collaboration. Firms are focusing a 
larger share of their R&D on activities that are linked to their specific competencies, and are 
acquiring complementary technologies from other firms, universities and government labs. 
This trend has been facilitated by the expansion of ICT, which reduces communication costs. 
The result has been a rapid rise in virtually all forms of collaboration, from sponsored and 
collaborative research to strategic alliances, mergers and acquisitions, and, notably, technology 
licensing.   
Collaboration has been facilitated by the expansion of markets for technology that allow for 
formal, market-based exchanges of knowledge via patent licences. Licensing provides another channel 
by which patented technology can be disseminated and utilised – at a price negotiated by buyer and 
seller. In the OECD/BIAC survey, 60% of responding firms reported increased inward and outward 
licensing over the past decade, and 40% reported increased cross-licensing. While good statistics on 
inter-firm licensing are lacking, estimates in the United States suggest an increase in licensing 
revenues from USD 10 billion in 1990 to more than USD 100 billion in 2000.  
Markets for technology affect economic performance and structure in many ways. They provide a 
means for the diffusion of patented technologies among a larger number of innovating organisations. 
In addition, they allow firms to concentrate their R&D resources in areas in which they have relative 
strength and allow them to rely on others for complementary technologies, possibly improving the 
overall efficiency of industrial R&D and innovation. Technology markets can also provide a channel 
through which firms sell or license technologies they cannot use themselves, encouraging additional 
investments in innovation. A growing number of firms report significant revenues from outward 
licensing of technologies they have developed, but do not intend to commercialise. IBM alone has 
reported revenues of more than USD 1.5 billion in recent years from technology licences, mostly on a 
non-exclusive basis.  
Markets for technology also influence industry and market structures. Technology markets create 
niches for new types of firms, such as intermediaries that broker matches between potential buyers and 
sellers of technology and R&D service firms. The number of such firms has grown in recent years, as 
has R&D performed by technical service firms. Markets for technology are also important to so-called 
fab-less semiconductor firms that design chips and license them to other manufacturers, and to small 
biotechnology firms that identify drug targets that are then licensed to larger pharmaceutical firms for 
clinical trials, manufacturing and marketing. These firms lack the complementary assets, such as 
marketing and manufacturing, which are necessary to successfully commercialise their inventions. 
However, the full economic effects of markets for technology are not well understood. It is not 
clear, for example, how such formalised, market-based transactions complement rather than substitute 
for the more informal exchanges of technical knowledge that are recognised as drivers of innovation 
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performance. Nor is it clear how markets for technology compare with other formalised channels of 
technology transfer, such as strategic alliances, mergers and acquisitions and collaborative research, in 
transferring codified and tacit knowledge.  
Numerous questions remain about the role of public policy in facilitating and sustaining 
technology markets. What role can and should governments play in linking buyers and sellers of 
technology or in creating technology markets? Can changes in accounting standards to highlight the 
value of intangible assets and revenues associated with licensing encourage the development of 
technology markets? There is some evidence to show that the strengthening of patent rights in Japan 
has stimulated greater inward and outward licensing of technology, but does this also apply 
elsewhere? Other countries, including the United Kingdom and France, have established licences of 
right that offer patentees a discount on certain fees in exchange for a commitment to license their 
inventions; however, their effectiveness has not been evaluated. How effective are mechanisms such 
as licenses of right in encouraging technology licensing? Additional work is needed to answer these 
questions. 
5.  Recent changes in patent regimes 
Patent regimes have gone through important changes in the past two decades, most in the 
direction of strengthening patent rights, in the sense of reinforcing the exclusive rights conferred to 
patent holders, expanding their coverage and easing their enforcement. This upward shift in most 
countries coincided with upward international harmonisation of patent regimes. It was based on the 
view that stronger patents would boost innovation (Jaffe, 2000; Gallini, 2002; Schatz, 2003; Martinez 
and Guellec, 2003). 
The design and enforcement of patent policies is increasingly the responsibility of new and more 
powerful governing bodies. Reforms were initiated in the United States in the late 1970s, and the 
centralised court system set up in 1982 (Court of Appeal of the Federal Circuit, CAFC) has been 
instrumental in strengthening the rights of patent holders in the United States. The EPO, with Europe-
wide coverage and a centralised examination system, was also set up in the late 1970s. In 2002, the 
Japanese government created the Strategic Council on Intellectual Property under the Prime Minister’s 
Cabinet with the aims to establish a national strategy for intellectual property (IP) and to implement 
the corresponding policies (an IP strategic programme was issued in July 2003). At the global level, 
IPRs were included in international trade negotiations, and WTO was given enforcement power at the 
Uruguay Round in 1986-1994, resulting in the signature of TRIPS in 1994, which is considered as an 
important milestone in international harmonisation efforts. Negotiations are currently taking place at 
WIPO to increase international harmonisation of substantive patent law across countries, and some 
efforts have been initiated at the trilateral level to increase co-ordination among the three major patent 
offices in the world: the USPTO, JPO and EPO. 
Major changes experienced by patent regimes in the United States, Japan and Europe in the past 
two decades can be summarised as follows:  
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Extended coverage of intellectual property protection. Areas that used to fall outside the patent 
subject matter are now partially or totally included, notably software, business methods and 
some inventions close to basic science, although differences remain across jurisdictions (which 






Patents confer broader protection, especially in new areas. Patent claims in new areas often 
cover far more than what the inventor actually discovered or invented. Some of the current 
patenting practices in new areas may extend protection to a broad range of applications 
unknown at the time of patenting (e.g. uses of genes).  
Filing procedures are increasingly flexible and less costly, notably at the international level. 
Several mechanisms to defer filing and examination procedures at patent offices, such as the 
system introduced by the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), have transformed the initial 
application into a sort of option to patent that allows inventors to retain the right to patent in 
foreign countries for longer periods of time.  
The rights of patent holders are more frequently and strongly enforced in court. Since the 
creation of the CAFC in 1982, the rate of invalidation of patents by courts has substantially 
decreased in the United States. Efforts to create specialised courts are ongoing in other 
jurisdictions: legislation is expected to be passed next year in Japan in order to create a high 
court specialised in IPRs, and the implementation of a centralised patent litigation system is 
currently under discussion in Europe. Moreover, damage awards in patent litigation trials have 
substantially increased in recent years. 
Restrictions on the exemption for research use. Recent developments indicate that the 
conditions to apply research exemptions may become increasingly restrictive in the future. In 
2002, the CAFC held that research exemptions would be granted in the United States when 
research is solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strict philosophical inquiry.  
Despite trends towards harmonisation, differences remain in patenting requirements across juris-
dictions. A comparison between USPTO and EPO estimated grant rates for patents applied in both 
jurisdictions (see Figure 7) reflects those differences and suggests that the patenting requirement may 
have been lower in the United States than in Europe during the 1980s and 1990s: i) the difference 
between USPTO and EPO grant rates for patents with US priorities also applied at EPO was around 
30 percentage points; and ii) the estimated EPO grant rate for patents first filed in the United States 
(US priority) has remained about 6-8  percentage points below the average grant rate at EPO. 
Differences in granting procedures in the United States and at the EPO might have contributed to these 
differences (Quillen and Webster, 2001). Notably, the US system seems to be more flexible, allowing 
the final grant to be different (usually narrower) than from the initial application. In fact, concerns 
about low patenting requirements, especially in new patenting areas, have prompted some reforms at 
USPTO in recent years, such as the introduction of a second examination for business methods in 
2000, and the explicit requirement of a “specific, substantial and credible utility” for biotechnological 
inventions to be patentable in 2001.  
  18 
Figure 7. USPTO and EPO estimated grant rates 


























estimated USPTO grant rate for priorities with at least 1 subsequent EPO application (%)
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estimated EPO grant rate for patents with at least 1 US priority (%)
 
Note: EPO grant rates are defined as number of applications with grant date divided by total number of applications, sorted by 
year of priority (data on EPO grants is still partial for recent years). The methodology to estimate the grant rate at USPTO for US 
priorities also applied at EPO consists of the following steps: 1. Select all EPO applications with at least one US priority in the 
EPO database; 2. Track the corresponding patent number in the USPTO database on grants; 3. Divide the number of US 
priorities in EPO applications with a grant date at USPTO by the total number of US priorities in EPO applications, sorted by 
year of priority. Priority year corresponds to the initial date of filing of a patent application worldwide, regardless of subsequent 
filings in other countries; it normally corresponds to the date of filing in the applicant’s domestic patent office. 
Source: OECD Patent Database, November 2003. 
Recent changes in patent regimes have contributed to the rapid growth in patenting activity in 
most countries by making patents a more attractive strategy for inventors. Reinforcing and broadening 
the rights provided by patents have resulted in increasing their value to firms, while the opening of 
new fields to patents has had a direct effect on filing numbers. 
6.  Intellectual property at public research organisations 
Academic patenting – the patenting of inventions resulting from university and public research, 
whether supported fully or in part by public funds – has emerged as a new arena for the expansion of 
intellectual property policies in OECD countries and beyond (OECD, 2003b). The rise of academic 
patenting is to a large extent founded in the notion that it encourages the commercialisation of research 
results, with significant private and social benefits. It is part of a broader policy framework aimed at 
fostering the impact of public research on the economy through various means such as public/private 
partnerships, incubators, etc. 
In 1980, the United States passed what is widely considered landmark legislation, the Bayh-Dole 
Act, which granted recipients of federal R&D funds the right to patent inventions and license them to 
firms. The main motivation for this legislation was to facilitate the exploitation of government-funded 
research results by transferring ownership from the government to universities and other contractors. 
Although academic patenting did occur prior to Bayh-Dole, it was far from systematic.  
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Taking inspiration from the United States, nearly all other OECD countries have reformed 
research funding regulations or employment laws to allow research institutions to file, own and license 
the IP generated with public research funds. The main focus of the legal and policy changes has been 
to transfer title from governments or individual researchers to PROs, and to give academic inventors a 
share of royalty revenue in exchange. The rationale is that ownership by the PROs, as opposed to 
individual researchers (or to not patenting), provides greater legal certainty, lowers transaction costs 
and fosters more formal and efficient channels for technology transfer. In addition to reforming legal 
and regulatory frameworks for the ownership and exploitation of academic IP, governments are 
encouraging the development of academic patenting by other means, such as reduced patent 
application fees for universities and support, often on a time-limited basis, for the creation of 
technology transfer offices or the prosecution of academic patents. 
Results from the recent OECD/PRO survey on patenting and licensing, sent to PROs in OECD 
countries in 2002 show that the United States has a huge lead over other OECD countries in academic 
patenting: universities and federal labs received over 8 000 patents in 2000 (5% of total patenting, 
rising to 15% in biotechnology). Academic patenting in other countries, as measured by the number of 
patents granted to public research institutions, ranged from the low hundreds in Japan, the Netherlands 
and Switzerland, to close to 1 000 at German public labs and Korean research institutions in 2000-
2001. Not all academic patents are licensed and not all patents earn income, however. Most public 
research organisations negotiate a very small number of licences per year (often fewer than ten). Even 
in the United  States, the average number per university is 24 per year. A few leading research 
organisations in countries such as the United States, Germany and Switzerland may earn millions of 
dollars or euros in licensing revenue, but the gains are highly skewed as a few blockbuster inventions 
account for the greater share of revenue. Licensing income, even at the best performing institutions, is 
an extra benefit for research and education and rarely represents more than 10% of research budgets. A 
fact frequently missed, however, is that in several countries most licences are for non-patented 
intellectual property, such as biological research material or copyrighted works. 
Box 3. OECD/PRO Survey 
The OECD undertook a survey on patenting and licensing in public research organisations in 2001/2002. 
The survey collected information from technology transfer offices at three types of organizations: i) research-
performing universities, both public and private; ii) research laboratories and agencies operated and fully funded 
by the government; and iii) other research organisations that receive a significant share of their total funding from 
public sources. It inquired about the organisational structure, size and funding of technology transfer offices, the 
size and scope of the intellectual property portfolio (e.g. number of patent applications and grants, filing 
jurisdiction), licensing practices and licensing income.  
The survey was administered by government ministries or their consultants in Belgium (Flanders), Denmark, 
Germany (non-university PROs only), Italy, Japan (universities only), Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Switzerland and Russia. Australia and the United States provided aggregate data based on existing surveys of 
universities and non-university PROs. Response rates varied across countries and between universities and other 
PROs, ranging from 52% to 90%. Results of the survey were published in the report Turning Science into 
Business: Patenting and Licensing at Public Research Organisations (OECD, 2003b). Several questions, such as 
R&D expenditure or patenting expenses, however, had low response rates and were eliminated in the tabulations. 
Because the questionnaire focused on patents that were assigned to or applied for by the institutions surveyed, it 
is possible that the results under-estimate the total amount of academic patenting in some countries, especially 
those in which PROs do not automatically claim title to inventions or cede them to industry or individual inventors.  
Source: OECD (2003b). 
  20 
Despite the small amount of (formal) academic patenting activity that takes place outside the 
United States, the increased focus on protecting academic inventions and licensing them to companies 
has raised a number of concerns common to countries throughout the OECD area and beyond. These 
concerns range from the impact of patenting on the traditional missions of universities, the effect on 
the direction of research, the actual costs and benefits of patenting and licensing, to the effects on the 
diffusion of and access to publicly funded research results.  
What has been the impact of IP and technology transfer activities on the direction of research? 
Quantitative studies tend to show that patenting has led universities to conduct more applied research. 
By making university research more responsive to the economy, is there a danger that basic research 
will suffer? On the one hand, several studies in the United States have found that universities and 
individual researchers that have seen the largest increases in patenting are also those which 
experienced the greatest gains in academic publications. On the other hand, the rate at which academic 
patents are cited in other patents fell (relative to the average) between the early 1980s and late 1990s 
in the United States and is now lower than the citation rate of patents granted to business. This 
suggests a possible drop in the quality of public research – or at least of its patented component. 
Should all patentable academic inventions be patented? As academic inventions arise in areas 
closer to basic research, scientists and policy makers are concerned that choosing to patent certain 
inventions could block downstream research. One example is that of research tools, in which granting 
a patent could inhibit diffusion by increasing the costs and difficulty of using such tools in applied 
research. In response, the National Institutes of Health in the United States (NIH) have espoused a 
policy to not knowingly apply for patents on research tools and to discourage their grantees from 
doing so. Such guidelines are being emulated by funding agencies and research institutions in other 
countries.  
What is the impact of patenting on the diffusion of public research? There has been some debate 
about whether PROs should grant exclusive licences to the private sector for discoveries that have 
benefited from public funds. Licensees often require exclusive licences as they offer more protection 
for the necessary development to be conducted before a university-provided invention can become a 
marketed product. The issue is particularly crucial for start-ups which have no other asset than the 
licence. On the other hand, by definition, exclusive licences limit the diffusion of technologies. The 
OECD/PRO survey shows that the mix of exclusive and non-exclusive licences granted by PROs is 
fairly balanced, and that exclusivity is often granted with restrictions on the licensee side. Research 
institutions often include clauses in licence agreements to protect public interest and access to the IP 
for future research and discovery. Licensing agreements in many institutions include a commitment to 
exploit the invention on the part of the licensee, particularly if the licence is exclusive, and to agree on 
milestones in order to assure that commercialisation will take place. Hence these patents cannot be 
used simply to block competitors. 
Another area of debate concerns the use of the so-called exemption for research use that has been 
in use in universities in both the United States and in EU countries, either formally or informally. 
Traditionally, universities have been exempted for paying fees for patented inventions they use in their 
own research. The rationale is that universities fulfil a public mission. As more public research is 
carried out with business and generates monetary rewards, the rationale becomes less clear. The extent 
and status of this exemption differs across countries and is often ill defined. This research exemption –
 or rather its interpretation – has recently been the subject of policy debate and litigation: recent court 
decisions in the United States have tended to restrict its meaning. There is now growing pressure on 
governments to clarify the scope of the research exemption in relation to the research missions of 
universities. This issue also relates to the management of IPR for international co-operative projects. 
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Many of these concerns or issues will take time to resolve. The growing reliance of public 
research institutions on various sources of funding, including from industry and contract research, as 
well as demands by society for greater economic and social returns on investment in public R&D, 
have made academic patenting a reality that is more likely to increase than decrease. While research 
institutions and firms are working to find solutions to problems as they arise, governments and 
research funding agencies have a role to play in providing guidelines on academic patenting and 
licensing and in fostering debate. More information on the amount of patenting and licensing, and the 
costs and benefit of patenting for universities, would also help inform policy makers and institutions 
alike. Data are needed on the costs of managing IP, inter-university licensing activity, and the amount 
of additional industry-sponsored research generated as a result of academic patents. Greater effort 
should be made to repeat the OECD/PRO survey in order to build time-series data and improve 
international comparability of data. 
7.  Biotechnology, patents and diffusion 
The biological sciences are yielding an impressive array of inventions which involve the 
manipulation and use of genes and genetic elements, and there has been a surge in patenting in this 
area in recent years. Patents have emerged as the most important form of intellectual property 
protection for much of the biotechnology industry, in particular the biopharmaceutical sector.  
Patent protection for biotechnology inventions has been available for over 20 years. Each year, 
thousands of biotechnology patents are issued worldwide, leading to the successful development of 
new products, services, and tools in fields as diverse as agriculture, pharmaceuticals, environmental 
clean-up, and industrial products and processes. An important early legal landmark was the 1980 US 
Supreme Court Diamond vs. Chakrabarty decision on the patentability of a genetically modified 
bacterium, after which inventions involving life forms were deemed patentable in the United States. 
Over time, court decisions, legislation (such as the 1998 EC Biotechnology Directive), multilateral 
trade agreements and examination guidelines at the major patent offices have confirmed the 
patentability of biotechnology-based inventions.  The categories of patentable biotechnology 
inventions in many OECD countries have expanded over the years to include genes, gene fragments 
and genetic-based tools and diagnostics, genetically modified plants and animals, and a host of 
inventions derived from the revolutions in genomics, proteomics and pathway engineering.  
Biotechnology patent statistics show some special characteristics. First, there has been a rapid 
rise in patent grants. From 1990 to 2000, the number of patents granted in biotechnology rose by 15% 
a year at the USPTO, and by 10.5% at the EPO, compared with a 5% increase in overall patents. 
Second, the share of US organisations granted patents is much higher in this sector than in other 
sectors. Third, the public sector has played an important role in the growth of patents for 
biotechnological inventions. For example, US and European PROs own 30% of all the patents for 
DNA sequences filed between 1996 and 1999. Finally, start-up companies have a higher share of 
biotechnology patents than do large, established pharmaceutical companies. 
Industrial surveys on the effectiveness of patents in protecting inventions across sectors show that 
pharmaceutical firms traditionally place a high value on patents for protecting intellectual property – 
more so than do other industries (Levin et al, 1987; Cohen et al., 2000). In the pharmaceutical sector, 
where innovation costs are very high, regulatory approval substantially increases time-to-market, and 
few R&D projects result in marketed drugs, patents are considered an essential factor in protecting 
competitive advantage. Patents are also very important to start-ups and university spin-offs in the 
biomedical field because both rely on protected intellectual property as their main asset in raising 
capital for development. The importance of patent protection for public sector research is more 
controversial. Commercial innovations are generally considered a by-product of government-funded 
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basic research. Whether patent protection helps or hinders the development and use of these inno-
vations by others is still unclear.  
In public debates about patent protection for biotechnology, there are some concerns related to 
adequate access to patented inventions, and the quality of issued patents. By definition patent holders 
are granted the right to restrict others from using their inventions. In some cases, it is felt that this 
restricted access can have negative effects on upstream research or downstream clinical use. For 
example, patents over research tools may increase the difficulty of obtaining the necessary tools and 
materials for basic research and increase its cost. There is also some concern about the quality and 
breadth of patents issued by patent offices, notably some DNA patents. Some believe that in a number 
of cases the criteria of novelty and inventive step are not being met, and that broad patents are issued 
that could give the patent holders an overly-strong negotiating position vis-à-vis possible licensees 
(Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2002; Walsh, Arora and Cohen, 2003; OECDc, 2003). 
Despite these concerns, recent empirical surveys conclude that, on the whole, the patent system 
as applied to biotechnology inventions is doing what it is intended to do and that there is no 
widespread breakdown in the licensing of biotechnology patents. Examples of licence stacking, 
restricted access, and poor quality patents do exist, but in the majority of cases industry and 
universities have found workable solutions to mitigate their effects. Diffusion occurs through licence 
negotiations, inventing around and alternative access solutions, such as the creation of public 
databases. Nevertheless, continued vigilance is necessary to ensure that licensing practices do not 
overtly restrict access.   
Meanwhile, there is room to improve access and market penetration without undermining the 
patent system. Given the important role of PROs in biotechnology patenting and licensing, many of 
the problems highlighted here were mentioned in the previous section; in particular OECD countries 
should consider: 
Encouraging good licensing practices in the public and private sectors. The licensing of 
patented technologies can provide financial rewards to inventors while encouraging the 
dissemination and use of inventions by others. Licensing guidelines or model contracts are 
self-regulatory solutions to some of the perceived problems associated with the patenting of 
biotechnology. OECD governments are working towards good practice guidelines that should 




Clarifying and reinforcing research exemptions. There is a consensus in favour of defining a 
space in which basic research inquiries could be free of overly burdensome IP restrictions. 
Many observers are concerned that the present patchwork of national research exemptions is 
both ill defined and may be breaking down due to legal challenges. OECD countries may wish 
to clarify how research exemptions are used in practice and consider how better research 
exemptions that would permit limited use of patented technologies, while offering adequate 
protection for those who create novel research tools, might be crafted. 
Exploring alternative access arrangements. The private and public sectors are beginning to 
experiment with alternative institutional solutions to access problems, in some cases agreeing 
to place certain inventions in the public domain, in others creating mechanisms for sharing 
bundles of IP. Understanding how patent pools, patent clearinghouses and public databases 
can be used in biotechnology, and what peculiarities of the technology or industries will 
require different solutions than in, for example, electronics, would help move these access 
arrangements closer to reality. 
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Economic analyses of knowledge transfer mechanisms. Technology diffusion occurs within an 
increasingly complex web of relationships involving industries, universities, and small and 
large firms. Patents allow these informal and ad hoc forms of interaction to occur. It is 
important to develop methodologies that can explain how technology transfer occurs in these 





Improving the quality of patents issued. Some observers are of the view that the administration 
of the patent system could be improved so that fewer patents, of less expansive scope are 
issued, which in their view would increase certainty about the validity of granted patents. 
Governments could compare how examiners in different jurisdictions interpret the criteria of 
patentability for biotechnology inventions, and whether these criteria are applied with 
sufficient rigour. 
Monitoring emerging access challenges. New challenges for access and high transaction costs 
are likely to emerge as different types of intellectual property – patents, copyrights, and 
database rights – are brought together by firms exploiting interdisciplinary fields such as 
nanotechnology. Governments need to anticipate where the next generation of challenges are 
likely to emerge. 
8.  Software and services 
The patentability of software-related inventions is currently one of the most heated areas of 
debate. Software has become patentable in recent years in most jurisdictions (although with 
restrictions in certain countries, notably those signatories of the European Patent Convention) and the 
number of software patents has risen rapidly. However, there remain fundamental questions about 
whether software should be patentable and, if so, whether specific characteristics of software demand 
that different rules be applied to ensure that patenting provides true incentives for innovation, allows 
follow-on or incremental innovation and facilitates knowledge diffusion. The patentability of business 
methods – often software-based – has further fuelled the debate, especially as concerns the possibility 
that low quality patents might block or impede the fledgling electronic commerce sector.  
Since 1998, software-related inventions (and mathematical algorithms in general) are patentable 
in the United States as long as they produce a “useful, concrete and tangible” result, in addition to the 
usual criteria (novelty, non-obviousness and industrial application). However, in Europe and to some 
extent in Japan, they are only patentable if “sufficiently technical in nature” (which excludes business 
methods in particular), a position which has been recently confirmed in Europe, although the 
legislative process is still ongoing (Hall, 2003; Motohashi, 2003).  
Following permissive patentability trends, patents for software and business method inventions 
have increased rapidly in recent years in the United States. Various estimates indicate that the number 
of software patents granted by the USPTO grew from fewer than 5  000 per year in 1990 to 
approximately 20 000 in 2000, or approximately 15% of all US patents granted in that year (Hunt and 
Bessen, 2003). In contrast, business methods patents represent a very low share of the total number of 
grants, with around 1 000 grants per year in the US since 1998. Interestingly, software publishers 
account for only a fraction of software patents – only 6% of software patents according to one recent 
study – with the majority of software patents owned by large firms in the ICT manufacturing and 
electrical machinery sectors. Large software consultancies and other service-sector firms also account 
for a small, but growing, number of patents to date. This pattern reflects the increasing role of software 
and services business units within large ICT firms, as well as the growing pervasiveness of embedded 
software in a range of electrical and electronic devices.  
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Growth in software and business methods reflects both increased innovative activity and changes 
in patenting behaviours. R&D spending by software and ICT firms has grown rapidly over the past 
decade. Microsoft’s R&D expenditures alone grew from USD 270 million in 1991 to USD 4.4 billion 
in 2002. More than three-quarters of ICT firms responding to the OECD/BIAC survey reported that 
they were generating more inventions now than ten years ago (Sheehan, Guellec and Martinez, 2003). 
Nevertheless, the patenting strategies of these firms have also changed. More than three-quarters of 
ICT firms in the survey reported that they now patent technologies they would not have patented a 
decade ago – even if the technology had been patentable then. Software and ICT firms see patents as 
an important bargaining chip in negotiating alliances with other firms and as a means of generating 
additional revenue via licensing. Indeed, more firms in the ICT sector than in other sectors reported 
increases in outward licensing and cross-licensing over the past decade. Other research has also 
demonstrated the key role of strategic patenting in the semi-conductor industry (Hall and Ziedonis, 
2001). 
Does increased patenting for software and business methods stifle innovation and facilitate anti-
competitive behaviour? Software programmes tend to be complex, modular products that combine 
multiple functions, each of which may be the subject of a different patent. Increased patenting may 
therefore inhibit follow-on innovation or the assembly of complex programmes as it increases 
transaction costs. Interoperability also needs to be high, meaning that open standards and interfaces are 
critical to ensuring innovation and market entry. On the other hand, if patents give more protection, 
they also could require more disclosure, which can be helpful for reducing the exclusion effect 
generated by patents. Network effects are also strong in the software sector, and switching costs can be 
high, locking-in customers to dominant products, especially if interoperability cannot be assured. In 
this context, patents might contribute to enhancing competition and innovation by allowing new 
market entrants to defend their technological position against incumbents.  
In summary, when addressing the issue of software protection, the following points should be 
considered: 
As in other areas, patent offices should ensure the quality of software-related patents. Patents 
with extremely broad, abstract claims have sometimes been granted, notably in the field of 
Internet-related business methods. Not only should patented inventions be novel and not 
excessively broad, but patent documents should also disclose all the information necessary for 
a person skilled in the art to be able to replicate the invention in a reasonable period of time. 
The information disclosure requirement should be subject to the same standards prevalent in 
other fields of technology, which stress the importance of publicising patented source code for 




The interaction of patents and copyright may be an obstacle to the diffusion of technology in 
this area, and thus further innovation, as patents protect the invention whereas copyright 
forbids the publicity of the way in which the invention is implemented by forbidding reverse 
engineering (Graham and Somaya, 2003). In addition, as copyright forbids reverse engineering 
(closed source code is protected as such), and as software patents do not have to reveal their 
source code, disclosure of software knowledge is clearly hampered in the current IPR setting. 
This calls for government attention focusing particularly on the cross effects of copyright and 
patent, and on insufficient disclosure requirements in software patents.  
Software is pervasive. Less than 10% of software patents in the US are granted to software 
companies. Actually, according to survey data, between 25 and 40% of business expenditure 
R&D in all industry has a software-like outcome, reflecting the fact that many operations 
which used to be monitored by mechanical means are now mediated by software. Hence, a 
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special treatment of software in general regarding IP might affect patterns of innovation 
beyond the software industry, and create unintended effects on the R&D industry-wide. 
Important segments of the software market are moving towards an open-source approach, 
which clearly helps disclosure and follow-on innovation, but the viability of the economic 
model for open source software is uncertain. In current open source approaches, attracting 
financing for innovation is not as straightforward as with proprietary, closed source software 
that is sold in the marketplace. To date, rewards to open source innovation have been 
essentially non-monetary (e.g. reputation) or based on the provision of complementary 
services (e.g. customisation, support). It would be worth exploring whether patent protection 
could be useful to open source software developers in creating sustainable business models 
and markets for technology, while guaranteeing the disclosure of source code. One aspect of 
this question is that patents might provide, as in other fields, the protection that inventors 
require to fully disclose their inventions – a necessary condition for an open source approach. 
• 
9.  Conclusion: Policy issues and options 
The analyses presented in this report suggest a series of policy issues and options, and 
recommended topics for more in-depth analysis in the future. These concern the development of 
markets for technology and the access to basic inventions, as well as the patent system itself, its 
principles and the way it works. 
The paucity of economic evaluation of the patent system is striking. Most of the changes to patent 
regimes implemented over the past two decades were not based on hard evidence or economic 
analysis. It is necessary to develop economic analysis in this domain that would inform the policy 
debate, giving governments a clearer view beyond the arguments put forward by pressure groups. 
Such analysis should rely notably on quantitative evidence: an effort to build and make available to 
analysts the corresponding databases has been initiated notably by the OECD, but this work needs to 
be broadened. In addition, more information is needed on the ways in which patents are used by their 
holders, for instance as regards in-house implementation, licensing contracts and business strategies. 
In parallel to this analytical effort, policy makers might encourage experience-sharing across 
countries: there are significant differences in patent regimes and many countries have experimented 
with various policy mechanisms, but there have been few attempts to systematise this experience and 
disseminate best practices across countries. 
Analysis and policy messages presented in this report also apply to a certain extent to developing 
countries with significant national innovation capacity. These countries need a patent system strong 
enough to attract foreign direct investment, to ensure inward licensing and to encourage local 
investment in research. However, these countries also need to protect their ability to access and digest 
existing foreign technology, just as developed countries used to do in their development stage (Barton, 
2003). The specific features that these countries might build into their patent systems to address these 
various objectives is a topic for future research. 
9.1.  Encourage the development of markets for technology 
The expansion of markets for technology is a major achievement of a well-functioning patent 
system, as these markets enhance the circulation of technology. Our knowledge of technology markets 
remains insufficient, and future studies should be devoted to improving it and addressing many of the 
questions that have not been yet fully investigated: How do they work? How does information 
circulate between the various actors? How are agreements settled? What is the role of intermediaries? 
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What is the impact of technology markets on technology diffusion and competition? To what extent, 
and in which areas if any, do market transactions on technology substitute for non-market spillovers? 
As technology markets interact with important government concerns - notably competition - there 
is a need for further reflection on the economic impact of certain instruments such as cross-licensing 
and patent pools. In addition, governments are potentially important actors in technology markets as 
they sponsor most basic research that is then licensed by PROs. Government policies on patenting and 
licensing practices at PROs affect certain segments of the market, such as users of basic science. More 
broadly, one might wonder whether these markets are confronted with certain failures that might 
justify some kind of government intervention, especially as regards SMEs. On this basis, policies 
could be designed to support the development of markets for technology and remove barriers which 
could hamper their development. 
9.2.  Ensure access to basic inventions  
Patenting of basic research and patenting by PROs (which perform most basic research) have 
contributed substantially to increasing investment, achievements and commercialisation in the 
research areas concerned, notably biotechnology. This practice raises new issues, mainly regarding the 
conditions of access to the outcome of that research. Although there is no sign of a global failure here, 
there have been cases of restricted access (e.g. genetic tests) and proliferation of rights slowing down 
research and raising its cost (tragedy of the anticommons). New entrants and future developments 
could upset the delicate balance between protection and diffusion. In order to avoid future problems in 
this regard, governments may consider taking two steps: 
Protect and clarify the exemption for research use. This is needed to ensure that the conditions 
and cost of basic research remain manageable while preserving incentives for business to 
invest in certain upstream areas of research. The statute and extension of research exemption 
differ across countries. An international comparative study analysing its evolution across time 
and how it is currently used by universities and businesses is necessary to clarify the current 
debate.  
• 
•  Ensure that patenting does not reduce incentives to disseminate inventions by universities. 
There have been publicised examples of academic publications being delayed due to patent 
filing, licensing terms reducing diffusion, etc. The extent of these phenomena is unknown, and 
needs to be monitored. As market signals are increasingly and efficiently used for orienting 
university research and linking it to the needs of the economy, governments should take 
measures to safeguard the public mission of universities which is a major factor of innovation 
in the long run.  
Based on a broad review of the evidence, governments might consider a series of policy measures 
aimed at fostering the diffusion of university research. Such policy measures may include the 
following: i) grace period: the possibility given to the inventor to file for a patent in a given period of 
time after publishing the invention; ii) provisional patents: one-year option for possible future filing; 
iii)  elaborating and promoting guidelines for licensing of basic research that support the broad 
diffusion of basic research. Governments might also explore policies for promoting the diffusion of 
non-patented inventions made by PROs. More generally, policies for promoting the use of public 
domain knowledge and information, notably through the Internet, need to be made more systematic in 
order to provide the appropriate conditions and incentives for public knowledge to actually be 
accessed and used by the public. 
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9.3.  Revisiting the working of the patent system 
An initial economic investigation of the working of the patent system reveals limitations in the 
adequacy of this system for enhancing innovation and diffusion of technology. Historically, the patent 
system evolved for various purposes, including, but not only, the economic benefit to society. In this 
respect, it is necessary to review recent problems with a certain sense of urgency, but it might also be 
useful, in a longer-term perspective, to revisit certain pillars of patent systems as they stand today.  
An immediate issue is to assess how new areas of technology and knowledge are addressed by the 
patent system. Software, genetics, and business methods are the most recent, and are soon to be 
followed by proteins and nanotechnology. New areas are subject to controversy: should they be patent 
subject matter at all? How to ensure that patent protection in these areas is not mainly an instrument 
for rent seeking and blocking access? How to equip patent offices with the ability to grant patents of 
sufficient quality in these new areas (e.g. relevant breadth, sufficient inventive step, etc.)?  
As the patenting tradition evolves based on experience gained in established fields, accom-
modating new fields is not straightforward. Patent offices faced this problem previously when 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals became patent subject matter. The issue actually is twofold: i) to 
analyse the economic impact of patent protection in these fields and compare it with alternatives, such 
as copyright or no specific legal protection at all; and ii) to have patent offices rapidly accumulate 
experience in new fields so as to avoid early-stage mistakes. Databases of prior art should be set up 
rapidly. In addition, criteria for granting or rejecting applications and for giving patents an appropriate 
breadth should be clarified as rapidly as possible after patentability of the subject matter has been 
decided (more rapidly than was the case for biotechnology and software). 
A second issue is the quality of patents. Low-quality patents are those that protect inventions of 
limited novelty or that provide overly broad protection. Low quality patents can be costly to society. 
Their proliferation not only swells the number of patents and patent applications that must be reviewed 
by potential innovators and patent offices, but also creates uncertainty about the validity and 
enforcement of patents more generally. The societal benefits of such patents are likely to be low, but 
they can nevertheless be leveraged by their holders for rent-seeking purposes: they may be used as a 
threat against other companies, especially small ones, or as part of patent thickets for closing market 
access to potential competitors. The more important patents become to innovation and economic 
performance, the more necessary it is to improve the quality of granted patents, and to do so at a 
reasonable cost. Various means have been already set in place in different jurisdictions and could be 
considered by others:  
An opposition system seems an efficient way of ensuring the quality of patents: once a granted 
patent is published, third parties can oppose the decision at the patent office, where an internal 
court examines the case including any new evidence provided in the opposition process. The 





A centralised court system is necessary for ensuring higher legal certainty of enforcement and 
the validity of rights. The United States pioneered this with the creation of the CAFC in 1982, 
Japan is following step now with an IP high court, and it is key to the success of the future 
Community patent that Europe does the same. 
International co-operation for promoting quality at the lowest cost. Current negotiations at 
WIPO (Substantive Patent Law Treaty, SPLT) and formal co-operation among the trilateral 
offices go in this direction. Discussions are being conducted for setting up databases of prior 
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art in new fields and mutual recognition of search and examination results. These are steps, in 
a way, towards the objective of a global patent system which would allow inventions to be 
protected worldwide. The rationale for this evolution is the increasing share of patent 
applications filed in different national offices at the same time (as part of the globalisation 
process), which generates duplication of work between national patent offices and increases 
costs for patentees. Limits to international harmonisation at this stage are fixed by differing 
patent regimes across countries concerning, among other things, subject matter, inventive step 
or scope of patents. 
Encouraging patentees to self-select their applications: The social cost of filing patents could 
also be reduced by discouraging both applications for minor or economically unimportant 
inventions and strategic patenting. Alternative means for that purpose include the following: 
i) stricter examination: low-quality applications would be deterred by a low probability being 
granted; ii) reduction of fees once a patent is granted (as opposed to rejected): such a discount 
would encourage self-selection by patentees so that the number of low-quality applications 
would decrease; iii) second-tier patent protection: enhance the use of so-called petty patents or 
utility models systems as an alternative to standard patents for minor and less novel inventions 
(such a system has been working for a long time in many countries; it was recently modernised 
in Australia); and iv)  setting up a credible public domain alternative: for example, en-
couraging firms to publicise their inventions on dedicated Internet sites at low cost when the 
only purpose for patenting is to avoid others patenting first (a practice referred to as defensive 
patenting).  
• 
Taking a longer-term perspective, certain fundamentals of the patent system could be subjected to 
economic scrutiny with the view to improving the incentives to innovate and diffuse technology. The 
uniformity of the patent system, understood as equal treatment for all inventions within the subject 
matter, is a prominent example of a principle which should be reviewed. Given the diversity of 
inventions across industries and fields of technology in terms of cost, and the existence of other means 
of protection or market conditions, it is not clear whether the “one size fits all” principle of the current 
patent system should be maintained. Should patent protection for software and drugs be awarded for 
the duration, given that technology and economic cycles are widely different in these two areas? What 
are the alternatives to this uniform approach, and what would be their costs and advantages as 
compared with the current system? Other directions to be investigated in the long term include the 
possibility of tailoring the degree of protection to the value of the invention. This is already the case 
for renewal fees. Considering that patentees have to pay to keep their patents in force, there is an 
incentive to inventors to stop renewing protection once the value falls below a certain level and let 
them lapse so that the invention becomes part of the public domain. Such an approach could be 
consistently extended to other aspects of patents which affect the degree of protection, notably 
breadth. This is to some extent the purpose of petty patent systems, which provide narrower and less 
expensive protection than standard patent systems. The current two-tiered system in Europe, with 
national patents of national validity only, a usually smaller novelty requirement and a lower cost than 
Europe-wide patents granted by the EPO corresponds in a way to this differentiated approach. Having 
patentees pay more for broader patents would not be straightforward to implement, but it certainly 
deserves investigation.  
As patents play an essential role in market-centred systems of innovation, economic criteria 
should be used more systematically to evaluate the ability of patent systems to foster innovation and to 
encourage technology diffusion. Despite broad changes in patent regimes over the past two decades, 
no systematic economic evaluation has been carried out with a view to informing policy choices. The 
patent system will face new challenges in the future with the emergence of new technologies; the 
increasing importance of service-type innovations; the growing role of markets in the production and 
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diffusion of knowledge; the arrival of new countries on the technological scene; increased 
globalisation; the convergence of various technology domains (e.g. biotechnology and ICT), fostered 
by the emergence of broad-band communication, which generates overlapping of various types of IPR 
(database protection, copyright and patents); and the promotion of the public domain in the Internet 
age. In this context, the importance of patents will not decrease but the conditions under which patent 
systems fulfil their role, encouraging innovation and diffusion, will evolve. Patent systems will be 
better prepared to confront these challenges if they have already been subjected to policy-oriented 
economic analysis.  
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